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It's Economic Consequences and Policy Implications for L.D.C..s
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the implications for less developed countries o
the hypothesis that workers' productivity depends on the wages they
receive. In particular, we show that this hypothesis may explain the
high urban wages and unemployment found in many such countries.
The market equilibrium is shown not to be pareto efficient. If the
government could not control urbaxv'rural migration, but could control
wages andurbanemployment, it would, in general, set wages and
employment levels differently. The sources of Inefficiency are
identified. The (constrained) pareto optimal policy can be implemented
via taxes and subsidies; but two instruments (both specific and ad
valorern wage tax/subsidies) are required.
More generally, policy changes will affect both the urban wage and
the level of unemployment, and these consequences need to be taken into
accounce, both In the determination of shadow wages to be used In co3t
benefit analysis and In the analysisis of the incidence of any set of
taxes and subsIdIes. The shadow price of labor may differ markedly from
what it would be if wages were arbitrarily fixed and there were no
migration. In particular, in the special case of the HarrisTodaro
migration model, with fixed rural wages and productivity depending only
on the absolute wage received, the shadow wage is the market wage,
regardless of the relative evaluation of current and future consumption.
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Under a variety of circumstances, the wage which a firm pays has an
important effect on the productivity of its labor force. This simple
observation has profon Implications on the nature of market
equllibriim. It implies, for instance, that there may be competitive
equilibria In which demand doe3 not equal supply: wages may not be cut,
even in the face of an excess supply of labor, for to do so mIght lower
the productivity of the labor force more than proportionately to the
reduction in the wage, and hence labor costs would rise. The law of
supply and denand is repealed! It also implies that, since the wage
productivity relationship may differ for different jobs, equilibrium may
be characterized by (ex ante) Identical workers receiving different
1FinancIal support from the National Science Foundation and theHoover
Institution Is gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of this
paper was presented at the 1982 meetIngs of the American Economic
Association, New York, December 2B3O. The author is Indebted to Debra
Ray for helpful comments. I have also greatly benefited from
discussions with Raaj Sah. Our joint work (Sah and Stiglita
[forthcomingj) generalizes and extends many of the results reported
here.wages. Indeed, even with identical firms, equilibrium may be
characterized by a wagedistributionwith tne higher wages paid by some
firms being exactly offset bythehigher productivity. ftheware
productivity curves characterizing different groups differ, there may be
high rates of unemployment In some groups while other groups are fully
employed. Moreover, reductions in the demand for labor (associated,
say, with business cycles) may have their Impact concentrated on
particular groups, those for whom the (maximal) ratio of proctlvIty to
wage Is lowest. Cyclical reductions in demand may be accompanied by
layoffs rather than work sharing (as predicted by most of the standard
Implied contract theory).
This paper Is particularly concerned with explorinc some of the
policy implications in the context of' L.D.C.'s, e.g. for wage sus1die
and shadow pricing. The fact that the wage is endogenously determ inec,
rather than arbitrarily given, has, we believe, some important
consequences which may be fundamentally different from those in which,
say, the urban wage is arbitrarily set at a level above that which would
clear the market. Such models provide no Insight Into what will happen
when the government changes some policy. In particular, they provide no
insight into the circumstances in which such changes will lead to
changes in the urban wage. A central thesis of this risearch is that
policy changes will affect the urban wage, and thus affect the level of'
unemployment; and that these consequences need to be taken into account,
for instance, both in the determination of shadow wages to be used in
cost benefit analysis and intheanalysis of the full incidence of' any
st of taxes and subsidies.
We show that the presence of unemployment of wages in excess of themar<et clearing level does not, in itself, indicate that tne economy is
inefficient. In a planned economy, wages too might well be in excess of
the market clearing level. On the other hand, In the class of models
with which we are concerned here, there Is no presumption that the
competitive equilibrium Is efficient; and in particular, that the level
of i.employment which emerges In the maret equilibrium •* what
macrofteconomists might be tempted to refer to as the natural level of
unemployment has any optimality properties.
This paper is divided into five sections. In section I, we revie.
the basic arguments for why wages affect productivity; section II
discusses the implications of the dependence of productivity on wages
for marks €quillbrIurn. Section III assesses the efficiency of the
market equilibrium. The presence of unemployment, of wages In exceos of
the market clearing level, does not, in itself, Indicate that the
economy Is Inefficient. In a planned economy, wages too m1t well be
in excess of the market clearing level. We show, however, that there Is
no presumption that the competitive equilibrium is efficient; and In
particular, that the level of une:nployment which emerges in the market
equilibrium, what macroseconornists might be tempted to refer to as the
natural level of unemployment, has any optimality properties. Section
IV then explores the policy implications, focusing in particular on the
implications for tax policy and cost benefit analysis. Section V
presents some concluding remarks.
I. Why do Wages Affect Productivity.
There are a large number of reasons that a firm may expect that an
Increase in the wage it pays may have a positive effect on theproductivity of its labor force.
(a) The efficiency wage hypothesis. Tnis is the oldest explanation
provided within the development literature (see e.g. Leibenstein).2
hen workers are close to the subsistance level, then increases in their
nutritiomal level andhealthcare will lead to an increase In their
productivity.3 An Increase In wages is generally believed to result In
an Increase In nutrition and hence in productivity. The relationship
between the paid bytheIth firm, wage, w1 and the productivity of its
laborforce,'j,isconventionally depicted as in figure 1, wIth an
Initial region in which increases In wages lead to more than
proportionate increases In productivity. We write
A11(w1), A'>O, A1"(w1)<> 0 as w1 <>w (1)
Thecurve Sho.4s that for low wages, Increases in wages have a marked
(and an Increasing) effect on productivity; at high wages, however,
diminishing returns sets In: though Increases In wages continue to
increase productivity somewhat, the increment in productivity from each
successive increase in wage becomes smaller and smaller. The shape of
the curve is Important for many of the results obtained below.
If the urban worker Is sharing his wage with family members in the
rural sector who receive a wage of Wr, then the productivity of an urban
worker will depend not only on the firm's wage, Wj; but also on the
rural wage wr
2Some of the analytic implications have been explored by Mirrlees
(1975).Stiglitz(1976), and Dasgupta and [19814a, 19514b].
3Recently Bliss and Stern have examined the empirical validity of this
hypothesis.Ai(Wipwr)p ak/wr<0 (2)
Moreover, the magnitude of the increase in productivity from a iven
change In wages will he smaller than It would be if they did not share.
As a consequence, firms may attempt to provide meals and health care to
their workers, to ensure that a larger proportion of thewage Is sent
on productivity enhancing expenditures. They may also subsidize other
prduct1vIty enhancing expenditures, e.g. throughacompany store.
Trius, (2)canbe generalized to A1(w1wp)wherep Is the price
vector. Firms may also hire members of the same family, to reduce the
dissipation of the benefits of high wages from sharing. If the worker
Is sharin his income with family members who are unemployed or whcare
employed elsewhere in the urban sector, then productivitymayhe
positivelyrelated to the amount of wages paid by other firms, w,'
negatively related to the unemployment rate.
AIAI(wl,w,wr,U),A1/w1>0, Aj/;<O, i/WrK0,Aj/>C(3)
Analternativeexplanation of the dependence of A on the
unemployment rate is that individuals go Into debt during job search;
they must repay these debts after obtaining employment, thus reducing
the funds available for consumption.
In the limiting case where the interest rate is zero arid where
Individuals engage In rent seeking activity to the point where the
lifetime consumption of the individual who obtain the highwage jobs is
is the vector of'wage3paid by other firms. Since we focus on
symmetric equilibria, all components of w are identical.the same as those wno remain in low wage jobs (and do not search), them
an increase in the wage increases expenditures on job search, Lt does
not increase labor productivity.5 3ut this is an extreme case. If
there is a positive interest rate, then even if lifetime expected
utilities are equalized by rent seeking expenditures, consumption during
periods of employment will be higher in high wage firms. Moreover, to
the extent that this is an important problem, firms 1ll he induced to
recruit workers In ways which ameliorate these effects.
(b) Labor turnover. A second Important way that workers' behavior
affects the productivity of firms Is through labor turnover.6 In most
jobs, there are costs of hiring and training which are specific to the
firm. So long as individuals do not pay these full costs at the moment
they are hired (recouping them later In the form of higher wages', them
the greater the quit rate, the greater the firm's expenditures om
training and hiring costs. Increasing the wage rate will, in general,
l•ad to a reduction In the quit rate, and hence to an increase in the
profits of the firm.
The retention rate r (which equals one minus the quit rate and
hence the turnover costs, depend on the relationship between the given
firm's wage and all other wages in the economy. Lower wage individuals
have a higher probability of finding a job at a higher wage, and thus of
Assuming, that is, that productivity depends on 1ifet1me consumption,
or, if it depends on current consumption, at a zero interest rate
individual smooth their con.gumption evenly throughout their life.
61n the context of developed countries, this hypothesis has been
explored by Salop (1973), Stlglitz (1972, 1985), and Hall (1975) among
others. In the context of less developed countries, eee Stiglltz
(19714).quitting. This is true whether there Is costly search, or whether all
individuals apply to all firms offering a higherwagethantheir present
firm, au the firm simply randomly picksamong the ap:licants.
1oreover, the greater the unemployment rate, the less likely it is that
the worker will find a better job. Thus, in thishypothesis
r=r (w1, ,w,U),r1>O,r2<o,r3<o,r,>O ()
Theeffect of higher quite rates Is to decrease the "net"
productivity (net of turnover cost). Firms would not have to pay higher
wages to reduce turnover costs if either (a) they could force workers to
sign binding contracts; or (b) workers paid for all of the training
costs. Indentured servitude Is,in mostcoxitries,illegal.
As an empirical matter, It appears that workers seldompay the full
turnover costs at the moment they are hired; and so long as workersare
risk averse and there Issomechance that they will leave the firm
(either because they are badly "matched" with the firm or because of
someexogenousreasons which Induces them to leave) the optimal contract
between the firm and the worker will entail the firm bearing some of the
risks associated with the costs of labor turnover (so turnover willbe
costly to the firm). (See Arnott and Stlglitz [19853). There are
further reasons for workers not bearing the entire costs oftraining and
hiring. Workers may have insufficient capital; arid the costsof
trainingandhiringmay not be verifiable. Were the worker to have to
pay the full training and hiring costs, there might be an incentive for
firms to overstate these costs, andthento fire workers, making a
profit out of the difference between the payments andthetrue trainingcosts.
(c) Incentive Effects.7 It Is, in general, costly to monitor
workers. If there were no unemployment and if all firms paid the market
clearing wage, then the threat of being fired would not lead individuals
to reduce their shirking: they would know that they could quickly obtain
another job. But If firms pay wage In excess of that of other firms, or
if there Is unemployment (so that a fired worker must spend a period in
the unemployment pool before he again obtains a job) then workers have
an Incentive not to shirk; there Is a real cost to being fired.
This again gives rise to a productivity wage relationship of the
form (3), with
BA BA BA
> 0, <0, <0, >0:
Bvr BU
Anincrease in other's wages reduces productivity, an increase in
unemployment increases productivity.
Cd) Morale Effects. It is sometimes postulated that an Individual's
behavior Is affected by his views of how fairly he is being treated, or
more generally, how he sees himself being treated in relationship to
Tme Incentive effect of paying high wages, within the context of
developed countries, has been analyzed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (198),
Calvo (1979), and Calvo and Phelps (1977).
8Afullanalysis of this motive for paying higher wages again requires
an investigation into alternative methods of providing incentives. One
such method is to provide a bond, which the individual forfeits if he
shirks. The difficulties with this are similar to those discussed
above. Alternatively, the firm cotfidthreatento lower the wage of any
individual caught shirking. But lowering the wage simply Increases the
likelihood that the individual will shirk in subsequent periods, and
hence Is not an effective incentive device. (See Shapiro and Stig].itz).otners. Thus, the wage relative to others'wages enters into the
utility function, and consequently also enters Into the effort supply
function.9
(e) Quality effects.° Changes In thewage affect the mix of
applicants for a job. If reservation wages are correlated with
productjvltjes on the job, by offering a higherwage,a firmobtains, on
average, a higher quality labor force.11 Again, in this hypothesis th
productivity of the worker is a function of the wage paid by the given
firm relative to the wages paid by all other firms.12
(f) Recruitment effects. It is costly for firms torecruit workers,
particularly to find workers who are "well*matched" with the firm. Fve
If search were costless, a firm paying a higherwage would have a larger
applicant pool among which to choose workers, and this would enable his.
tc recruit a more productive labor force.13
9Like the previousexplanation, this requires that it be costly to
monitor the actual leveL of effort put out by the individual. Fora
discussion of evidence for this effect in thepsychological literature,
see Akerlof, 198L. For an earlier dicusjon of these moraleeffects,
see Stiglltz, 1973, 197'4a.
101n the context ofdeveloped countries, this model has been explored by
Stiglitz (1976a), Weiss (1980), and Nalebuff and Stlglltz. For L.D.C.'s
see Stiglltz (1982a).
The assumptions that firmscan Imperfectly observe the inputs of
individuals (as in the previous two explanations), and thatthey can
imperfectly screen individuals prior to hiring them are critical.
Moreover, we also require that individuals not be able to guarantee
their peformancc (either for one of the reasonspresented above, or
because individuals are risk averse, and Imperfectly informedconcerning
their skills relative to the job.)
12When workersare heterogeneous, there is not, In general, a single
rural wage; what turns out to be relevant for most of theanalysis Is
the wage of the marginal migrant. When labor isheterogeneous, this is
(Footnote continued)II. Implicationsof theDependenceof productivity on sages for rnar-:et
equilibrium.
Regardless of the explanation, the dependence of productivity on
wages has one critical consequence: firms may not lower wages in the
presence of an excess supply of laDor. For to lower the wage will lower
the productivity of the labor force, and if its prouctivitv is lowerec
enough, the profits of the firm will be reduced.
2.1 IntroduotiQn: The basic efficiencywage rQdel. This is seen most
simply in the basic efficiency wage model (equatIon 1). We assume that
output of the firm is a function of the effective labor supply
F(XL)
where L is the number of workers. We call this technology the
u1ti1icative technology. Then profits of the firm, ,are
(ca)
(taking Output 35ournurneraire so wisthe real wage); the firm
maximizes this with respect to w and L to obtain
F'A'L— L, (7a)
F'A=w (7b)
or,dividing (7a) by (7b),
A'—A/w (8)
12(continued)
what wr will denote.
131n models with costly search, it may take some time before a firm Is
successful In filling a vacancy. The expected length of time is
dependent on the wages the firm pays. The effect of this is analagous
to that of a direct Increase in productivity resulting from a wage
increase.
Where there is no confusion, we drop the subscript I denoting the
Ith firm.(8) s1rly says that the firm chooses a wage to minimize its wae per
efficiency unit
mm w/A 9)
depicted as the point of tangency of the line through the origin with
the productivity curve. The solution to (8) Is referred to as the





may be less than the supply; nonetheless
lower their wages. A firm knows that an
work for a wage less than w will have a
sufficiently lower productivity that its
its profits lower.
This argument holds, with equal force, for any of the other
explanations we have proferred for the dependence of productivity on
wages. Thus, for instance, in the labor turnover model firms will not
lower their wages, even in the face of an excess supply of labor,
knowing that If they do so, they will face higher turnover costs, which
may more than offset the direct savings from the lower wages.
Though all of the models can yield equilibrium unemployment, the
different models do, however, differ in their welfare consequences and
policy Implications. Some of these differences we shall note below.
2.2 A eeral M9de1, In this section, we analyze the equilibrium of a
firms will not be induced to
unemployed worker who offers tc
lower productivity, a
labor costs will be higher, an:more general version of the wageproductivitY model.We focus our
attention on symmetric equilibria, in which all firms in the urban
sector pay the same wage. Then the productivity curve facingthe itn
firm can be written as
A =
A1(w1, Lwr,U). (11)
whenis the wage paid by other firms in the urban sector. (Inthe
symmetric equilibrium, w1 =
Weemploy a general production function of the form (where Q1 jthe
value of net output and L1 is the number of workers).
(Aj, Lj)
(12)
One special case of this is the labor turnover model,in which
=F1(Lj)Tj (Aj) Lj
(13)
where A now has the interpretation of the retention ratio, Tj (A) is
the expected turnover costs; T'(A) < 0, so Qj/ A > 0.
Another special case is that discussed earlier, where the production
function takes on the simple form
Q-F (AL). (5')
In this version, a more productive work is just a"multiple" of a less
productive worker. (In the more general case, a moreproductive worker
may be capital saving.)15
15To use the vocabulary of traditional growth theory, in the formulation
(5'), increases in labor productivity are "Harrodneutral" or "labor
augmenting". A more general formulation would have
(Footnote continued)Profits are still represented by (f).Profitrnaxh.ization entails




Notethat for the labor turnover model, (1) has a familiar
interpretation. The total labor costs per unit time of a worker Is
+T*1(q+p) (1)
where T*1isthe tra1n1n costs (not paid y tne worer',o th quit
rate (=1—r,the retention rate) and pthe Interest rate.(pT1j
theinterest cost associated with the training expenditure, and qTj
analogousto the depreciation costs on physical capital. Thus,
turnovercosts T1(A) can be written as
T1 (A) T*j (q +p), (15a)





Thus, if B' -0,increases In productivity are purely capital
augmenting.The quit rate function facing any firm, taking the wages of other
firms, the wage in the rural sector, and the unemployment rate a given,
is usually depicted as in figure 2; the solution to (114b') Is
represented by the tangency between the quit rate function, and the
1socost curve (15a). Thus, there exists an optimal wage for the firrr,
In excess of w,th, the minimumwage at which the firm can recruit
workers.
2.2.1 Te geeraljzed Effiieny Wage CnitLoR
Dividing (1Lb) by (1a) we obtain the generalized efficiency
condition:
A amQ1/aln
j A1 ln Q/alnA
The elasticity of productivity with respect to wages shcld ea
the ratio of the elasticity of output with respect to employment to the
elasticity of output with respect to wages.
2.2.2 r-baR etr Libiwi
We assume a fix number. of identical competitive firms. It is easy
to establish that the aggregative behavior of the sector is determined
by functions of the form (1La) and (14b) (or 16), where we substitute
the aggregate production function for the firm's production function.
From no on, L1willdenote the aggregate urban employment,average
urban wages, W1,thewage of a representative firm. Thus (lila) and
(11th) can be thought ofasdetermining the demand for labor and the wage
rate as a function of N, the supply oflabor to the urban sector. To
seehow this Is dre, we note that the rural wage is simply a functionof tne number ofruralworkers N.but workersare either in the irban
sectoror the rural sector:
0
a _i u'r





Moreover, from the definition of U:
1'J L/N (i° U U
Sbstitut1ng(1718) into the productivity equation, we obtair
A-A(w1,L, N) w1, ,W(NN)1 :/Nu)) (')
Substituting this into (16) we can solve for the equilibrium urban wagc
asa function of N and
=
(Na,L) (19)
Wecan solve (1'a) for the demand for labor bytheith firm as a




We can solve (19) and (20) simultaneously to obtain the demand for




Note that, in general the demand forlabor dependa on the aupply
(N) —An increase in supply of labor increases unemployment, which
increases productivity at any given wage, and hence increasesdemandif
the elasticity of demand for labor Is large, but may decrease demand if
the elasticity is srnall.1
The effect of a change of is more complicated, and is
discussed below.
2.2.3igration
Whenthe wage in the urban sector exceeds that in the rural sector,
we need to have a theory to determine how labor allocates itself between
the two sectors. We assume that the supply of laborers to the urban
sector, N, is a function of the urban wage, ,theunemployment rate,
the number of urban jobs, Land therural wage.
H(*ULu,wr) (22)
Wecan simplify (20)using(19) and (16):
N-
givingthe supply of workers to the urban sector as a function of urbar
wagesand employment.
The HarrisTodarøMQel. Aspecial caseofour migration model (22)
is the socalled HarrisTodaro migration hypothesis, in which migration
continues until the expected urban wage equals the rural wage
Then (23) takes on the form
(23'
and, using (17), (23) becomes
16Itis apparent with elastic demands that there will be a unique
equilibrium. With elastic demands,itis difficultto rule out multiple
equilibrium.(2'')
2.2.1aret1lbrium
Notice that in this model, the supplyoflabor In the urban sector-'
Is a functIon of the demand: just as we notedearlier thatthe demand for
labor Is a function of the unemploymentrate, and hence indirectly of
supply. There Is not the simple dichotomy betweensupply and demand
tnat characterized simple equilibrium models.Moreover, while in
traditional competitive supply and demand analysis, firmsand workers
tre3t the wage parametrically, now firmsdeterminethe wage. Thus,
while traditional analysis depicts demand andsupply as a function of
the wage, here, the wageiseniogenous., and the demand can, accordingly,
be thoaght of as simply a function of theSupply (eq. 21a an. the
Supply slnply as a function of demand. The derivation of the
pseudosupply curve is straightforward. Substituting (21b) into (23we
obtain:
Nuu((Nu),Lu) (2)
At a fixed wage, an Increase in the demand for laborreduces
unemployment, so leads to an increase in the supply of labor. Thesame
holds even if wages adjust, so long as thewage does not fall too much
as a result of an increase in N
U.
Theequilibrium, the intersection of the pseudosupp1y curve (2L4)
andthe pseudo demand curve (21a), is depicted in figure 3.
2.3 Sorie Speoja]. Ga3e
To gain insight Into the nature of the equilibrium, It isuseful to
Investigate three special cases of ourgeneralmodel (22).2.3.1 Theaaoute wage hypotheLs.
In the first, we postulate that the production function taves on the
multiplicativeform. Then, aswe noted earlier, (16),givingthe
optimal wage, takes on the simple form:
A1 /wi
=A1/wj (16')
If we now postulate further that proauctivity depends simplyon the
wage paid by the firm, the simple nutritional model (1), then the
efficiency wage (the solution to (16')) is independent of both the
number of workers In the urban sector, the unemployment rate, and the
employment level. Thus, (21b) takes on the simple form
=w (71;' )
ThederIvation of thepseudodemand curve is now straightforward:
L= (w*/A (w'))/A (w*).
Notice that the demand for labor is independent of the sup1y: th
pseudodemand curve is a vertical straight line. (See Figure L4a).
We focusonthe special supply equation (22' )correspon1ngto the
HarrisTodaro Model. We simplify further by assuming a land surplus
economy, where the rural wage is independent of the numberof
individualsin the rural sector,
wr r'
then (22') takes on the particularly simple form
17
We emphasize that this Is still not the most general model. We have,
in particular, Ignored the dependence of productivity on relative
prices. The omission of this would be particularly serious In the
analysis of a closed economy model, where the relative price of
agricultural and industrial goods affects industrial productivity. See
Sah and Stiglitz (1985).uuwr/ (19')
(SeeFigure 14a).Thereis a unique Intersection ofthepseudo4demand
and pseudomsuppy schedules. The level ofunerp1oymentisalso easy to
see diagramatically: it is simply the vertical distancebetween the
equilibrium value of L and the 115degree line.
2.3.2 TheRelativeWage HyQtesjs, Mltipleatjye TelRol9gy, The
second special case we Investigate Is that wherewe retain all of the
assurptions employed In the previous one, except thatproductivity is
postulated to be homogeneous of degree zero Inw, and Wr.
Theproductivity equation can be written as
4
Ai(wi/W9Wr/W1L
The migration equilibrium condition isgeneralized so thatte
equilibriumunemployment rate is assumed to be a (monotonically
decreasing) function solely of the ratio of rural-'urbanwage ratio:
M' < o (25)
orinverting
m(U). (25a)
Inequilibrium, WI ,soA Is simply a function of the unemployment
rate, or using (18),of
A -Aj(1,m(U),U) (16") IThus, (21b) takes on the special form of
= (L• (19')
.'e would normallyexpectthat an Increase in the unemployment rate would
lower the optimal wage paid by the firm; hence '>0.
Substituting(16")into (10), it isImmediatethat the demand for labor
issimply a function of
= i[(Lu/Nu)/A(1,m(1_(Lu/Nu)), 1(L/N))/A (21a')
=z(U)
We would normally expect that an increase in the unemployment rate
reduced the cost of an efficiency unit of labor; the effect of tnis on
the demand for laborers would depend on the elasticity of the demand for
labor. If, for instance, the elasticity of demandforlabor is low,
thenthe demand for workers actually decreases.
The supply of labor equation from (25a) is now
N Lu11M[wr/
lBThis Is, however, not necessarily the case. Under the assumption that
productivity Is homogeneous of degree zero In w1 ,andWr, the first
orer condition for the optimal wage can be written as
Theeffect of a change in U on the equilibrium level of w thus depends
onthe sign of
m' +Ai m'In the case of a fixed rural wage, we can write
(2")
Though(21a")and (214'fl thus describe the equilibriun for this model, it
is easier to see the effects of various policies if we express both the
"supplywage" (the wage at which a given unemployment is generated by
the market) and the demand wage (the wage set by firms) as functions of





See figure 30. Notice that in this case, the unemployment rate and the
wage aredeterminedindependently of the demand for labor. Rural
employment is determined essentially as a residual:19
N =NN NLu (u*)/1*u*.
2.3.2TheRelative Wage HypothesLTheLaborTwrQvePMQdel.
Thelabor turnovermodel yields similar results. Labor turnover
the more general case, where wr is a function of Nr, the
pseudosupply function takes on the form
*(1U)W(N) wr(N4Nu)wr(N 0 Lu(u)/14u).depends only on relative wages arid the unemployment rate. But the
efficiency wage condition takes on the form (15b), again yielding
=h(U).
The demand for labor equation is slightly different from flU). It
takes on the form:
F'(L)w +T.
where, it will be recalled, T is the turnover costs per wor<er (given by
(1 5"
Both T and warefunctionsof U, so, Inverting, we obtain
L =F'1(h(U) +T(U)).
The demand for labor Is again simply a function of the unemployment
rate. The equilibrium is again depicted by a diagram, such as figure.
III.cciceny of te Market qwiliFtur
The fact that some workers are unemployed suggests that resources
are not being usedefficiently.However, assessing the efficiency of
the market In the presence of the wage*productivity nexis Is not an easy
matter. We need to specify what the government's objectives are, as
well as the set of available Instruments. If, for Instance, the
government couldcontrolmigration directly, then It could eliminate
unemployment. It might, for instance, randomly assign some Individuals
to the high paying urbanjobs,but require all other Individuals to
remain In the rural sector. Such control of migration requires a level
of repression that many L.D.C.'s find objectionable. Accordingly, the
more relevant question may be, It the government could control directly
the urbanwagerate and the level of urbanemp1oymetwould It set these
variables at levels different from those of competitive markets?iternat1veiy, the government may not be able to controlwae and
employment directly; it may have to resort to wage subsidiesor taxes.
gain, we need to ask, if these are the only instrumentsavailaLje,
gouldthegovernment wish to impose such subsidies taxes, and Ifso, at
what rates?
In this section, we assume the government hasdirect control of
and L. We first assume thatthe government wishes to maxinize nztIcmal
output,and then consider the more general objective of (constrained)
pareto efficiency.
3.1 Assume that the government Is simply concerned withrnax1-I:lng net
national output. Let and r be output in the urban arid r'l se:cr,
respectively; then the government20
max u (A,,LN(,L) )
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Tosee what is entailed, we consider some special cases:
LabQr SupplyWithHarrLsTodaroModel
Assumedr ='r''the rural wage equals the value of the marginal prodct
of labor in the rural sector. If migration euilibr1um entails equating thc
ruralwage to the expected urbanwage,
L r-U u' u














-0when the rural wage is independent of the ntznber of workers in the
rural sector.
1.aorSwppy WithRkAvarsinIf Indiv1du1s are risk averse, and set theirexpected utility in the
urban sector equal to that in the rural, then, lettingv(O)=O, (where v Cw) is
the utility associated with wage w, with v"<0, asaresult of risk aversIon
and,
Ev=v(w)(1—U)+Uv (0) =v(w) (1—U)v(w))
din u'() din 1
dinN/dfl L u(w) din
3.1.1AsoltøWage4effjiRey MQdel HarrjsTodgro Migration
ifltheabsolute wageeffjcjency nodel described above,a =b0.
Thus, for that model, with expected wages in the two sectorsequalized,
the market. wage is set at its efficient level ((23c) Issatisfied) even
though there Is unep1oyment. Moreover If a =0and =0(the wage in
the rural sector does not change as workers migrate to the urbansector)
urban employment In the market economy is set at Its effIcientlevel;
for then (30a) becomes
WN=w-ruu'
whichIs clearly satisfied. Ifa0 but> 0, Itis set too low.
3.1.2 elative Wage Effic1nQy Model.
Under the relative wage efficiency hypothesis, with a fixedrural
wage, and the Harrls4Todaro migration equilibrium condition, a Is again
zero, employment is at the right level, contingent on the wage being
offered, but the wage may be either too large or too small. Whichdepends on hether a proportionate increase In the employment rate has a
greater or less effect on productivity than a proportionate Increase in
the average urbanwage.
Under the relative wage efficiency hypothesis, and the Harris—Todaro
migration equilibrium condition, but with a variable rural wage, a <0.





Hence,from(28a), itis clear that employment, conditional on the we,
maybeeither too large or too small (since the above expression does
not depend on the properties of the productivity function but clearly
does, the right hand side of (28a) may be either positive or negative.)
Similarly, from (28b), it is clear that the wage may be either too
high or too low. While
dlnL,dlfl
dlnN/dlflL
will be less than unity if individuals are risk averse, the sign of b
depends on the sensitivity of productivity to changes in the average
urbanwagerelative to its sensitivity to the rural wage rate and the
level of unemployment.3.2 ParQt efficiocy, The fact that thecompetitive allocation does
not maximize net national output does notImply that the market economy
Is not pareto efficient. Paretoefficiency may be most easily examined
in the context of the case where the ruralwage is fixed and hence
(under the HarrisMTodaro hYpothesis),so is the welfare of workers, Is
fixed. Pareto efficiency then requires themaximization of pro1ts jr





Contrasting (314)and(35) wIth (15) and (16), it is clear that the
market will essentially never be pareto efficientunless A2 = -
= 0.Further distortions obtain In the case of variable
wr
3.3 So&pces of Market Faj1pe. There are severalsources of market
failure in this economy. First, firms fall to take intoaccount the
effect of their wage and employment policy on theproductivity of
workers at other firms, both directly and indirectlythrough their
effect on the unemployment rate and ruralwages. (These productivity
externalities21 would arise regardless of theexplanation of the
21Some of the externalitiesappear to be pecuniary externalities, which
in traditional economic theory do not interfere withthe productive
efficiency of the economy. But the result that pecuniaryexternalities
(Footnote continued)wageproductivlty relationship.) Some of these externalities are
positive, some are negative. Policies -which leadto a reduced
unemployment rate are likely to reduce productivity (e.g. as a result of
incentive effects). Increases in productivity as a conseqence of a
higher quality applicant pool are at the expense of the quality of those
working at other firms, except to the extent that the wage/employment
policy has resulted in a better matching of workers with firms (on the
basis of comparative advantage.)
As a result, in this class of models the wage does not measure the
correct opportunity cost of labor. For instance, if the reason that
productivity Increases with the wage is that reservation wages are
correlated with productivity, then the applicant pool consists of all of
those whose productivity in the rural sector is less than the wage
offered by the firm; In that case, the wage clearly exceeds the
opportunity cost of a randomly selected applicant.
If by hiring an additional worker, more than one worker migrates
from the rural sector (to seek employment in the urban sector) the loss
in output exceeds the rural wage. Later, we present an example where
the loss in Output equals the urban wage.
Thro shout this section we have assumed that the government cannot
effect migration indirectly through subsidies to the rural sector. As
we show later, such subsidies are, in general, desirable (though It will
not be in the interest of any firm to provide such a subsidy). -
21(continued)
do not matter is special1 and does not hold In the class of models with
which we are concerned here, and more generally, as Greenwald and
StIglitz show (1985), in any economy In which there is Imperfect
information and/or an incomplete set of markets.IV. Policy
Indirect Intepwention. Tne government can attempttouse taxes and
sbsidles to effect the constrained optimum. Since there were two
variables that the government controlled, it requires at least two
Instrumentsto attain the constrained optimum. In particular, If we
impose ad valorem andspecificwage subsidies at the rates Tandt,
the firm




iftand iareset appropriately, so
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thenthe market solution will be a constrained optimum.
Note that a pure ad valorem subsidy leaves unchanged the equation
for the optimal wage (dividing (38) by (37)) but does increase the level
of employment. Thus, in the pure wage efficiency model, where the
market wage was optimal, the governnent will only employ an ad valorem
wage subsidy. A specific wage subsidy will increase the wage paid: it
will be partly shifted backwards towards workers (see Figure 5).
If the wage subsidy is shifted backwards towards workers, it willresult in an increase in the unemployment rate, as depicted in figure 6.
In contrast, in the pure efficiency wage model, where an ad valorem wage
sbiCy leaves the market wage unaffected, the unemployment ratQ is
unchanged, iftherural wage is fixed (under the HarrisTodaro migration
hypothesis)butbecause the numberofemployed workers increases, the
numberof unemployed increases. Onthe otherhand,if the ruralwageIs
not fixed, the out—migration from the rural sectorraisesthe rural
wage,and this reduces the level of unemployment. The consequences of
this are described more fully below.
Additional Taxes. Although by assumption, the government cannot
directly control migration, it may be able to affect the level of
migration (and the associated unemployment) by providing subsidies to
the rural sector, financed, for instance, bya taxon profits in the
urbansector.In the pure efficiency wage model, such subsidies
unambiguously increase national output and lower unemployment. In
modelswhere productivity in the urbansectoris affected by the rural
wage, such a policy has a positive effect on rural output and a negative
effect on urban output. The optimal rural subsidy entails a balancing
of these two effects.
Shadow Prices. The models formulated in this paper have very different
implications for shadow pricing from those of the standard model. First
the opportunity cost of having an additional worker in the urban sector
depends critically on the effect this has on the unemployment rate. If
the government's hiring of an additional worker left unemployment
unchanged, it would imply an induced migration of 1/14U workers, and
hence a loss in output in the rural sector of
wr/1MU, If Wisthernarinal procct of' labor. Under the hypothesis that expected inco"e in
tne urban sector equals the rural wage
U — W W (1J)
N
U
sothat the o?portunity cost of hiring an additional worker isbust the
urban wage. It is easy to ascertain, within the context of the models
formulated here, the effects of a change In urban employmenton U. or
instance If the rural wage is constant and equal to the value of the
marginal product and if the urban wage remains unchanged (as It willbe
in the pure efficiency wage model or in any other model in which the
urbanwage depenas simply on the rural wage and the unemployment rate,
as in the labor turnover model or the incentive models)22 then U ill
remain unchanged. If the rural wage Increases as workers leave the
rural sector, It implies that as the government hire more workers, the
supplywage (the urban wagewhere generates the indicted level of
umemployment) willbe higher.23
22Butin the efficiencyquality model, the mix of applicants applying
to 30b8 In the urban sector changes as urban employment changes, and




where,letting Lg denote government employment
L F'1 [/(1,m(u),u)J +
Lg
In the relative wage model, and
(Footnote continued)As figure 7 Illustrates, the new equilibrium level of unemployment
will be lower, provided the efficiency wage decreases with the
unempoy:nent rate. (But just the opposite occurs If the efficiency wage
increases witn U).
Note too, in the case where the rural wage is fixed, that changing
the level of urban employment has no effect on aggregate workers'
consumption; hence If all profits are invested, investment is maximized
by maximizing net national output. Regardless of the relative weight
associated with investment, the shadow price on labor Is the urban wage.
(Tnese results are In marked contrast to the earlier studies of Sen,
Marglin, etc., which ignored the endogenity of migration and of tirban
wage determination.)
If the rural wage increases as Individuals leave the rural sector,
then at a fixed urban wage, the unemployment rate wil be reduced, and
hence the opportunity cost of labor is less than the urban wage (but
still greater than the rural wage). The reduction in the unemployment
rate may lead to an increase in urban wage, but presumably by an amount
which Is less than proportionate to the rise in the rural wage.
V. Disequilibrium versus equilibrium models and wage dispersion.
In all of the models presented here, we have assumed that the wage
is determined endogenously. There is another important class of models
in which wages are set arbitrarily (say by custom, unions, or government




in the absolute wage model.happen as a result of a change in,say, taxes, and thus provide an
inadequate basis for the analysis of policy.Since the pure efficiency
wage model is one in which the wage does notdepend either on the level
of' hirjn In the sector, on
unemployment, public employment, wages paid
by other firms, or ad valoremsubsidies, the analysis of the rigid wage
model corresponds (for these policy variables)to that special case of
ourgeneral model. On the other hand, ourmodel predicts that even In
thepureefficiency wage model, a specific wage subsidy will havean
effect on wages paid in the urban sector.
In the c1sequIlibri models, the observedproductivity differences
between different sectors (or different firmswithin a given sector) may
ce viewed as cause by differences In theexogeneously given waze. In
or more general equillbrjun formulation, theremay exist differences In
the wages paid by different firms; laborturnover may be more important
to some firms than to others; physical healthmay be more Important in
someoccupations than in others; in suchcases, wages may be higher.
Even more interesting, however, Is thepossibility that identical firms
(identical jobs) may pay differentwages; the differences In wages being
perfectlyoffset by differences In productivity. Equilibriummay be
characterized by wage disperion, evenamong otherwise Identical firms.
In these models, there is no single direction ofcausation: productivity
is higher because wages are higher, andwages are higher because
productivity Is higher.
This paper has considered only some of theImportant facets of the
wage productivity nexus and its implications for developmentpolicy. It
has, not considered, for Instance, Importantconsequences for education
policy (whether education is for screening or humancapital formation)and investentpolicy (includIng the allocation of capital between the
urban and rural sector). These are questions which we hope to explore
elsewhere.REFgRENES
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Labor costs are inirnized with
—T. = 1
-,w.







Thedead fcr labor is a function of the supply, and the
supply a function of demand. Whilesupply noa1ly increases
with demand,demandmay increaseor decrease with supply.










Harris—Todara Migration Model with Absolute wage efficiency







Harris—Todaro Migration model with relative wage efficiency













Relativewage efficiency wage hypothesis
L
Figure 4
Supply wage gives that urban wage which generates the indicated
level of unemployment (in these diagramsWrisfixed, so
w =w/1u.)An advalorern wage subsidy leaves wage unchanged, but

















Government employment reduces unemployment rates, and hence
shadow wage is less than urban wage.
Figure 7
,-
///
Supply equation afr
increased goverrent
employment
Supply
Efficiency wage
U